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What is your couple type? 
Gender ideology, housework-sharing, and babies1 
Arnstein Aassve2 
Giulia Fuochi3 
Letizia Mencarini4 
Daria Mendola5 
Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
It is increasingly acknowledged that not only gender equality but also gender ideology 
plays a role in explaining fertility in advanced societies. In a micro perspective, the 
potential mismatch between gender equality (i.e., the actual sharing taking place in a 
couple) and gender ideology (i.e., attitudes and beliefs regarding gender roles) may 
drive childbearing decisions. 
 
OBJECTIVE 
This paper assesses the impact of consistency between gender equality in attitudes and 
equality in the division of household labour on the likelihood of having another child, 
for different parities. 
 
METHODS 
Relying on two-wave panel data of the Bulgarian, Czech, French, Hungarian, and 
Lithuanian Generations and Gender Surveys, we build a couple typology defined by 
gender attitudes and housework-sharing. The typology identifies four types of couple: 
1) gender-unequal attitudes and gender-unequal housework-sharing; 2) gender-equal 
attitudes and gender-unequal housework-sharing; 3) gender-unequal attitudes and 
gender-equal housework-sharing; 4) gender-equal attitudes and gender-equal 
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European ERC Grant Agreement no StG-313617 (SWELL-FER: Subjective Well-being and Fertility, P.I. 
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housework-sharing. The couple types enter into a logistic regression model on 
childbirth. 
 
RESULTS 
The impact of the typology varies with parity and gender: taking as reference category 
the case of gender-equal attitudes and gender-equal division of housework, the effect of 
all the other couple types on a new childbirth is strong and negative for the second child 
and female respondents. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The consistency between gender ideology and actual partners’ housework-sharing is 
only favourable for childbearing as long as there is gender equality in both the 
dimensions. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In the last few decades most developed countries have witnessed a dramatic change in 
gender roles and attitudes. Whereas some European countries, most notably the Nordic 
ones, have moved peremptorily towards gender egalitarianism both in the public sphere 
(i.e., the education system and the job market) and in the private sphere (i.e., the 
housework and childcare gender role-set), other countries appear to have experienced 
substantive changes in the first sphere but less in the family sphere, a feature epitomised 
as the “stalled gender revolution” (Hochschild and Machung 1990). Recent studies 
suggest that gender equality at the family level is also linked to reproductive behaviour, 
and stronger gender equality appears to be associated with higher fertility (e.g., Neyer, 
Lappegård, and Vignoli 2013; Oláh 2003; Duvander and Andersson 2006). Higher 
gender equality may very well lead to higher fertility;  more important however, as one 
moves away from the male breadwinner model, is the potential mismatch between 
gender equality (i.e., the actual sharing taking place across genders) and gender 
ideology (i.e., the “attitudes regarding the appropriate roles, rights, and responsibilities 
of women and men in society”; Kroska 2007). The mismatch between the two might 
result in “unfulfilled expectations”, and such a feeling of disappointment may lower 
fertility. To exemplify, if the woman has liberal attitudes towards gender roles (i.e., she 
has an egalitarian ideology regarding gender roles and gender relations in the couple), 
and the man does not fulfil her expectations through sharing household tasks, she might 
derive lower satisfaction from the partnership, which in turn may lower the chances for 
the couple agreeing on having children, which presumably lowers overall fertility 
(Mencarini and Sironi 2012; Aassve at al. 2014a). There is some evidence suggesting 
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that, indeed, inconsistency between attitudes toward couples’ sharing of tasks and 
actual division of housework reduces the likelihood of continued childbearing even in a 
high gender-equal society like Sweden (Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Brandén 2013). 
Our analysis follows up on these ideas and tackles the issue directly. Our 
hypothesis is that the mismatch between actual gender division of housework with 
respect to attitudes and beliefs regarding gender roles matters for explaining 
childbearing outcomes. We hypothesize that an inconsistency between gender ideology 
and partners’ actual gender division of household chores has a negative impact on 
childbearing behaviour. The analysis is made on a sub-set of European countries based 
on the Generations and Gender Surveys (GGS) in which information concerning gender 
ideology and sharing behaviour at the household level is available and with two waves 
of the panel survey. The countries with such information are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
France, Hungary, and Lithuania. Controlling for country differences and separating the 
model by gender and parity, we show how a couple's typology (defined by the 
consistency between gender attitudes and actual gender housework-sharing) differs in 
the rate of fertility progression from one survey wave to the other. 
 
 
2. Theoretical background and literature review 
2.1 Gender equality and fertility 
It is now increasingly acknowledged that gender equality (i.e., equal outcomes for men 
and women in both the public and private spheres) plays a role in explaining the fertility 
differentials in advanced countries. For instance, Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari (2011) 
argue that the recent upswing in fertility observed for highly developed countries can be 
explained by the way countries differ in gender equality. In other words, fertility 
appears lower in those countries where gender equality is low. The numerous studies 
considering the effect of gender equality on fertility tend to differ in that they use 
different measures of gender equality, the key disparities coming from some focusing 
on objective measures of country institutions, whereas others focus on actual sharing 
taking place within couples.  
As for the macro perspective, Mills (2010) tested the impact of six indices 
representing various dimensions of gender equality on fertility intentions. Only two of 
them proved to be significantly linked to fertility. The Gender-related Development 
Index (GDI), an index introduced by the United Nations Development Program in 1995 
that reflects educational attainment and income corrected by the existing gender 
inequalities, was found to be positively associated with fertility intentions. On the other 
hand, the European Union Gender Equality Index (EU-GEI), which measures the equal 
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sharing of paid work, income resources, and decision-making power and time 
(including childcare and leisure time) in a country, was found to be correlated with 
lower fertility intentions. These opposing effects are not necessarily contradictory, 
because the GDI portrays gender equality from a macro perspective as it reflects gender 
equality in a society, whereas the EU-GEI  is a summary measure representing gender 
equality as it is aggregated from the couples’ actual behaviour. 
Those studies focusing on the micro-level of sharing of household tasks (i.e., 
actual division of household work) tend to find a positive association of gender equality 
with both fertility intentions and fertility behaviour (e.g., Cooke 2008; Mills et al. 2008; 
Oláh 2003; Tazi-Preve, Bichlbauer, and Goujon 2004; Torr and Short 2004). The 
burden of domestic care more frequently lies with the female partner even in the most 
advanced societies, but is nevertheless mitigated by several couple characteristics. For 
instance, being part of a dual-earner couple and the time spent by the woman in the 
labour market affect the extent to which women are able to undertake childcare tasks 
and household work (Gershuny, Bittman, and Brice 2005; Tanturri and Mencarini 
2009). Tazi-Preve, Bichlbauer, and Goujon (2004) tested whether an unequal 
distribution of household chores and childcare duties had a negative effect on the desire 
to have children. Gender-equal men expressed stronger desires for children compared to 
men living in households where sharing took a more traditional pattern. This is in 
contrast to Torr and Short (2004), who found that both gender-equal couples and 
couples subscribing to a highly traditional division of household work had higher 
likelihood of progressing to a second child, thereby reflecting a U-shape relationship. 
Mills et al. (2008), while analysing Italy and the Netherlands, showed that an unequal 
division of household work had a negative impact on women’s fertility intentions only 
when they already bore a heavy load in terms of work hours and childcare, in particular 
if they were working women in Italy (as had previously been shown for the Italian 
context by Mencarini and Tanturri 2004). 
Nordic countries perhaps represent an exception regarding the link between gender 
equality in housework and childbearing. A study set in Sweden revealed that while the 
correlation between couples being more gender-equal in terms of housework-sharing 
and childbearing was positive, this effect disappeared when controlling for 
demographic variables such as age and parity (Nilsson 2010). One possible explanation 
for this is that the impact of gender-equal housework division on childbearing is 
mitigated by the effects of successful family policies (Oláh 2003). Indeed, family-
friendly services and policies matter for fertility and probably correlate with the extent 
that household tasks are shared. When comparing Italy and Spain during the 1990s by 
means of the European Community Household Panel, Cooke (2008) concluded that 
increased equality in women's employment increased not only the degree of equality 
within the home but also the likelihood of having a second birth. More specifically, 
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access to private childcare significantly increased the chance of childbearing in Spain, 
whereas a larger amount of childcare carried out by the father produced the same effect 
in Italy, particularly among employed women. The characteristics of the fathers may 
also influence fertility through gender equality in the household. Sullivan, Billari, and 
Altintas (2014) showed that the larger contribution of younger, more highly educated 
fathers to childcare and domestic work in very low-fertility countries was likely to 
facilitate an upturn in fertility. 
 
 
2.2 Gender ideology and fertility 
Gender ideology, referring to “attitudes regarding the appropriate roles, rights, and 
responsibilities of women and men in society” (Kroska 2007), can range from 
traditional gender ideologies emphasizing the value of distinctive roles for women and 
men (with men fulfilling their family roles through breadwinning activities and women 
through nurturing, homemaking, and parenting activities) to egalitarian ideologies 
regarding the family, which, by contrast, endorse and value men's and women's equal 
and shared breadwinning and nurturing family roles (Kroska 2007). Gender ideology is 
therefore a set of attitudes and beliefs regarding gender roles and the nature of gender 
relations, which can be measured in family surveys by batteries of questions about 
gender role-sets.  
Several studies look at the role of gender attitudes, the focus being especially on 
the extent to which gender ideology determines division of household work. The vast 
majority of studies support the idea that gender ideology to some extent affects actual 
division of household work, whereas the former, in turn, is driven by the influence of 
social networks and the cultural and institutional context where couples live (e.g., Blair 
and Johnson 1992; Greenstein 1996; Coltrane 2000).  
Only more recently have studies focused on the way gender ideology may also 
affect childbearing decisions. Here the evidence is more mixed, a feature largely driven 
by the use of different measurements (Mills et al. 2011). Puur and colleagues (2008), 
using data from the 2001–03 surveys of the DIALOG project, conducted a comparative 
analysis of men in Austria, Estonia, East and West Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, and Poland. Their results showed that more egalitarian men – in terms of 
opinions about and attitudes towards gender equality – desired to have, and actually 
had, more children than traditional men. In response to that finding, Westoff and 
Higgins (2009) replicated the analysis by using the same country data (except East 
Germany), but from the European/World Values Surveys. In contrast to Puur et al. 
(2008), they reported a negative association between men’s egalitarian attitudes and 
fertility. As Goldscheider, Oláh, and Puur (2010) explained, the contrast in those 
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findings was to a great extent driven by differences in the way gender ideology was 
measured: Puur et al. (2008) relied on opinions on the man’s and the father’s role in the 
family, whereas Westoff and Higgins (2009) used opinions on the role of the woman in 
society and her choice between work and children. As already highlighted in an 
extensive literature review by Coltrane (2000) on household labour, gender attitudes 
tend to better predict men’s participation in housework than women’s. Furthermore, 
gender ideology may matter differently for men and women: Kaufman (2000) showed 
that egalitarian women were less likely to intend to have a child and to actually have a 
child than traditional women, whereas egalitarian men were more likely to intend to 
have a child than traditional men. Miettinen, Basten, and Rotkirch (2011) found that 
men with either traditional or egalitarian attitudes had higher fertility intentions and 
desires compared to men with intermediate gender attitudes, independently of their 
family values. 
 
 
2.3 Gender ideology – gender equality mismatch and fertility 
An important point to be made is that gender equality has both macro and micro 
components. The macro perspective refers to the institutions that society provides in 
order to ensure equality across genders, and this means infrastructure such as childcare 
provision and national policies ensuring that men and women are treated on equal terms 
concerning education, work, and careers. The micro perspective refers to the family 
sphere, as there can be no gender equality when there is no equal sharing of household 
tasks. In the predominantly male breadwinner model of the 1960s and 1970s, fertility 
might have been high because there was no mismatch between gender ideology and 
equality – despite the low gender equality.  
Consequently, a successful transition to an egalitarian society depends on the 
macro perspective (i.e., diffusion of institutions at the national level) and the micro 
levels, the latter meaning increased willingness of partners to share household tasks. As 
is argued in Aassve, Fuochi, and Mencarini (2014b), the speed of this diffusion may be 
closely linked to long-standing and deeply rooted cultural differences across countries. 
This relates to the fact that gender ideology may very well be gender-specific. In other 
words, men and women may differ in the way they evaluate gender roles. Despite 
societal institutions evolving, thereby enabling gender equality, there might still be a 
gender ideology–gender equality mismatch in the family sphere, which is maintained 
through persistency in those norms. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that, 
despite the transition towards egalitarianism, there will necessarily be heterogeneity at 
the micro level. A society dominated by the male breadwinner idea may still have 
individuals and couples that have rather gender egalitarian attitudes. Likewise, gender 
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egalitarian societies may also consist of couples that subscribe to the male breadwinner 
idea.  
Gender ideology and gender equality in the private sphere do not necessarily go 
hand in hand. According to Press and Townsley (1998), changing social perceptions of 
the appropriate domestic roles result in reporting biases that do not automatically 
correspond to actual changes in the division of housework. Furthermore, women are 
more likely to respect the declared appropriateness of gender sharing of home tasks 
than men (Baxter 1997). This suggests that couples will differ in the combination 
between gender equality in attitudes and the actual division of household work. This is 
an important element because even in highly egalitarian societies some will 
nevertheless have very conservative attitudes towards gender roles. The key question is 
whether this combination of ‘declared’ and ‘acted’ gender equality has an impact on 
childbearing decisions. 
Esping-Andersen (2009), making a compelling case for why gender equality may 
matter for observed fertility levels across advanced societies, points out that consistency 
between gender ideology and actual equality may not be in place as societies transition 
from the male breadwinner model to an egalitarian model. As further explained by 
Aassve, Fuochi, and Mencarini (2014b), in the path of “women's revolution” for some 
countries there might be a transitional phase, when gender ideology is changing (in the 
sense that women's preferences are shifting, possibly as a result of educational 
expansion among women) and fertility will become lower as long as institutions do not 
adapt accordingly.  
The idea that such mismatch between gender ideology and gender equality might 
affect couples' decision-making with regard to childbearing and hence drive overall 
fertility levels derives from the work of McDonald (2000; 2006; 2013), who argues that 
it is not necessarily gender equality per se that matters for fertility: rather it is what he 
calls the gender equity and equality gap (see also Neyer, Lappegård, and Vignoli 2013). 
The concept of gender equity refers to “fairness of treatment for women and men, 
according to their respective needs, that may include equal treatment or treatment that is 
different but which is considered equivalent in terms of rights, benefits, obligations and 
opportunities” (UNESCO 2000). It is distinct and different from the concept of gender 
equality – which is more straightforward in the sense that it can be measured simply by 
comparing outcomes for men and women in areas such as education, employment, 
wages, participation, health, and so on – but also from the concept of gender ideology, 
which does not implicate any concept of perception of fairness of gender treatment 
(Mencarini 2014a, 2014b). It is important to be aware that gender equity is not the same 
as gender ideology in the sense that the latter term does not explicitly include a value 
judgement on what is considered fair or not.  
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What is clear from the current literature is that very few consider both gender 
ideology and gender equality when trying to understand the effect on fertility. The study 
by Miettinen (2008) makes a step in this direction by focusing on women's satisfaction 
with housework-sharing (and its role in childbearing). Studies directly integrating both 
actual sharing behaviour and gender ideology as determinants of fertility are very few. 
To the best of our knowledge the only study so far is by Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and 
Brandén (2013). Relying on the Swedish Young Adult Panel Study (YAPS), the authors 
combine attitudes towards sharing of childcare and housework declared before 
parenthood. These measures are then compared with the actual sharing of domestic 
tasks reported four years later. Their findings support the idea that inconsistency 
between these two measures reduces the likelihood of childbearing.  
 
 
3. Data and measurement  
3.1 GGS data 
The data used in our empirical analyses are from the Generations and Gender 
Programme (GGP), a data source of nationally comparative surveys whose core topics 
are fertility, partnerships, gender and intergenerational relations, and paid and unpaid 
work. Our sample is derived from the two waves of the Bulgarian, Czech, French, 
Lithuanian, and Hungarian surveys. The first wave of the data was collected in 2004 in 
Bulgaria, in 2005 in France and the Czech Republic, in 2006 in Lithuania, and between 
the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005 in Hungary. The second wave was collected 
three years later for all the countries except Hungary (four years later). Whereas other 
national GGP surveys also offer two observational points in time, only these five 
surveys offer satisfactory variables regarding gender attitudes and the division of 
household work, on which our couple typology is built.6 Information concerning 
division of household tasks is only available for co-residing partners: thus couples in 
which the partners are not living together are excluded. Moreover, we include only 
individuals who live with the same partner in the two waves. Homosexual couples are 
excluded. The resulting sample is further restricted to include only women aged up to 
45 years. The total number of observations in the cleaned sample is thus 9,326.  
                                                          
6 In particular, the German dataset had a different range of response values in the variables regarding 
housework compared to the other countries; the Dutch dataset missed one variable regarding housework and 
seven variables on gender attitudes that we needed to build the couple typology; the Australian one missed 
many items on attitudes, and the Georgian one had a sampling strategy with respondent replacement, which 
impeded the proper exploitation of the panel dimension. 
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Whereas these surveys provide relatively rich information about household 
members, in particular about the respondent’s partner and children, it is important to 
keep in mind that partners are not interviewed. The respondent’s perspective is 
maintained throughout the questionnaire, so that the respondents report all information 
about the partners. This has important implications for our measure of gender ideology 
on the one hand and sharing of tasks on the other. For the latter, the respondents answer 
to what extent the partners share, whereas their replies regarding gender attitudes refer 
to the respondent only. In this sense there is a potential asymmetry when mapping 
information from the respondent’s to the couple’s perspective. This is an important 
caveat of our analysis: on the one hand, the respondent might be biased in the way he or 
she reports sharing of household tasks, and men are less likely to report that their 
partners contribute significantly more to housework than they do, compared to their 
partners’ self-declared amount of housework. Consequently, men may tend to 
overestimate their contribution to domestic labour (Kiger and Riley 1996). On the other 
hand we cannot establish the gender ideology of the partner, which may matter for the 
extent to which disagreement arises within the couple.  
 
 
3.2 Typology of couples  
Our dependent variable is defined as a binary variable taking the value 1 if the couple 
has a child between the two waves, zero otherwise. In the regressions we include a wide 
range of control variables capturing age, employment, education and financial situation 
of the members of the couple, marital status, and satisfaction with the relationship with 
the partner. The key explanatory variable, however, is the couple typology, which we 
build from a combination of gender ideology (i.e., attitudes regarding gender roles) and 
information about the extent that household tasks are shared between partners. Attitudes 
towards gender equality derive from eight items, selected according to their sensitivity 
to issues regarding gender equality inside the couple, the family, and society. Questions 
are items of agreement on a Likert-like 5-point scale. The first two items belong to the 
theme of gender equality inside the couple relationship (“In a couple it is better for the 
man to be older than the woman” and “If a woman earns more than her partner, it is not 
good for the relationship”). Then there are another three items on the issue of gender 
equality within the family (“If parents divorce it is better for the child to stay with the 
mother than with the father”, “When parents are in need, daughters should take more 
caring responsibility than sons” and “A child needs a home with both a father and a 
mother to grow up happily”). The final three items refer to the issue of gender equality 
within society (“When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than 
women”, “A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled” and “A man has to 
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have children in order to be fulfilled”). These last two questions do not refer to gender 
equality attitudes directly and do not compare men and women, if taken alone, but they 
compensate each other when considered together, as happens with our attitudes index. 
Furthermore, they do show strong association with the other items, suggesting that 
agreement with these statements reflects more traditional attitudes – also for what 
concerns gender roles.7 
For the division of housework the question is framed as follows: “Please tell me 
who does the following tasks in your household” where the items on routine household 
work include: preparing daily meals, washing the dishes, shopping for food and doing 
the vacuum-cleaning. The possible answers are “always respondent”, “usually 
respondent”, “respondent and partner about equally”, “usually partner”, “always 
partner”, “always or usually other persons in the household” and “always or usually 
someone not living in the household”. We include these last two response values in the 
category “respondent and partner about equally”, assuming that the decision to 
outsource household labour represents ability and willingness to reduce the partner’s 
workload.8 
The first step in creating the couple typology consists of summing up the scores 
from the items on attitudes. Scores range from 1 (strongly agree), meaning low attitude 
toward gender equality, to 5 (totally disagree), meaning high attitude toward gender 
equality. As there are eight items, the index spans in the interval [8, 40], where 8 
reflects the lowest possible value of attitudes towards gender equality (i.e., highly 
conservative) and 40 refers to the maximum level of gender-equal attitudes. In the 
second stage we measure the extent to which the distribution of housework between the 
members of a couple is gendered. Initially the index is built by adding scores from -2 to 
+2, where -2 is assigned to the answer that a specific task is always performed by the 
woman inside the couple, -1 if the woman usually does that task, 0 if the partners 
equally share the task, +1 if the man usually does the task, and +2 if that task is always 
performed by the man. An important element of constructing the ‘sharing index’ in this 
way is that we allow for compensation between duties, meaning that tasks are given the 
same weights and are perfectly substitutable. In other words, cooking can be 
compensated by the activity of food shopping or cleaning. Given that we use four items, 
the sharing index is in the range [-8, +8], where -8 represents a situation where the 
woman does all of the housework, while at the other extreme an overall score of +8 
suggests a couple in which the man does all of the housework.  
                                                          
7 The reliability of this set of items on gender attitudes is tested through Cronbach’s alpha for each country, 
whose score is 0.59 for Bulgaria, 0.68 for Czech Republic, 0.65 for France, and 0.57 for Hungary and 
Lithuania.  
8 Cronbach’s alpha for the items on the division of household tasks is 0.77 for Bulgaria, 0.75 for Czech 
Republic, 0.57 for France, 0.70 for Hungary, and 0.74 for Lithuania. 
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In order to dichotomize both indices, here “low attitude toward egalitarianism” 
refers to scores from 8 to 24 of the index on attitudes, 24 being the midpoint of the 
interval 8–40, and “gender-unequal sharing of household work” refers to scores from -8 
to 0 of the index on housework. As already mentioned, the burden of unequal sharing 
lies predominantly on women, and as a result the very few cases of men experiencing 
unequal sharing against them were collapsed into gender-equal sharing. 
Table 1 shows country differences in the mean of both the index portraying gender 
equality in the attitudes of the respondents, and the index of gender equality in the 
couple’s division of household work. Not unexpectedly, France is the country with the 
highest average gender equality both in the reported attitudes and in the actual division 
of household labour. Bulgaria and Hungary are far behind France on the path of gender 
equality. This is especially the case for the attitudes index, and we see that the 
Hungarian sample in particular scores low on attitudes. Three additional unsurprising 
findings can be seen in Table 1. First, women do far more housework than men (as 
testified by the negative signs in the scores). Second, on average female respondents 
declare a more gender unequal division of household labour than their partners (as it 
stands out comparing in magnitude the last two lines in Table 1). Third, there is a wider 
gap between the levels of housework division reported by female and male respondents 
than between their reported attitudes toward gender equality. This fact seems to 
anticipate the mismatch between gender ideology (measured by attitudes) and gender 
equality (measured by the actual sharing) that will be analysed in our regression 
analysis. It is possible that some men who declare gender equal attitudes, but do not 
comply with what is asserted, may prefer to report a higher contribution to the 
household work than is actually the case. Or, an alternative interpretation, it could be 
that women feel the need to emphasize their effort in domestic work, while their 
expressed opinions on gender equality do not follow through. 
Table 2 presents the proposed classification of couples in types. In the type named 
“Consistent inequality”, couples are characterised by gender-unequal division of 
housework (mostly done by women) and gender-unequal attitudes. “Consistent 
equality” is our second type, characterised by gender-equal division of housework (i.e., 
the man does not do less than the woman) and gender-equal attitudes. “Inconsistency 1” 
is the combination of gender-unequal division of housework and gender-equal attitudes, 
whereas “Inconsistency 2” is the combination of gender-equal division of housework 
and gender-unequal attitudes. Table 3 gives the percentage distribution of these four 
couple types for the five countries of our dataset. 
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Table 1: Description of the indices of gender ideology and gender equality by 
country 
Gender ideology and equality 
Bulgaria Czech R. France Hungary Lithuania 
N=3,386 N=656 N=1,797 N=2,881 N=606 
Average Index for gender equality in the 
attitudes, female respondents 
(range: [8,40]) 
20.9 
(0.09) 
21.9 
(0.23) 
26.4 
(0.17) 
19.4 
(0.12) 
23.1 
(0.22) 
Average Index for gender equality in the 
attitudes, male respondents 
(range: [8,40]) 
20.8 
(0.11) 
21.6  
(0.28) 
26.2 
(0.18) 
19.7 
(0.14) 
22.6 
(0.21) 
Average Index for gender equality in 
housework, female respondents 
(range: [-8,+8]) 
-3.9 
(0.06) 
-4.1 
(0.14) 
-3.2 
(0.09) 
-4.2 
(0.06) 
-3.7 
(0.17) 
Average Index for gender equality in 
housework, male respondents 
(range: [-8,+8]) 
-3.2 
(0.07) 
-2.4 
(0.17) 
-2.2 
(0.1) 
-3.1 
(0.07) 
-3.2  
(0.16) 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 2: A typology of couples 
Division of household 
chores 
Level of gender equality in the attitudes as reported by the 
respondent 
Below the midpoint Above or equal to the midpoint 
Gender-unequal Consistent Inequality Inconsistency 1 
Gender-equal Inconsistency 2 Consistent Equality 
 
Looking at Table 3, we see that Bulgaria and Hungary are very similar and that the 
Czech Republic and Lithuania are very similar to each other and not completely 
different from Bulgaria and Hungary. In these countries the majority of couples are of 
the ‘Consistent inequality’ type, suggesting that the male breadwinner model is still 
highly prevalent. Interestingly, the ‘Consistent equality’ group is extremely small in 
Bulgaria and Hungary, but somewhat larger in the Czech Republic and Lithuania. For 
the Inconsistency 1 type (i.e., the couple has egalitarian attitudes, but the woman is 
bearing the brunt of the household work), we find much higher frequencies. Not 
surprisingly, France very much stands out. The ‘Consistent inequality’ couple type is 
considerably lower than is the case for the other countries, but here most interesting is 
the group Inconsistency 1, which stands at 53%. Thus, a large proportion of the French 
sample reports having gender-equal attitudes, but the majority of their household work 
nevertheless falls on women. Moreover, only 18% of the French sample reports 
consistent gender equality.  
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Table 3: Percentage distribution of couple types 
 Bulgaria Czech R. France Hungary Lithuania 
 N=3,386 N=656 N=1,797 N=2,881 N=606 
Consistent inequality: gender-unequal 
division of housework, gender-unequal 
attitudes  
67 58 25 71 48 
Inconsistency 1: gender-unequal division 
of housework, gender-equal attitudes  
22 26 53 17 34 
Inconsistency 2: gender-equal division of 
housework, gender-unequal attitudes  
8 9 4 9 9 
Consistent equality: gender-equal division 
of housework, gender-equal attitudes  
3 7 18 3 9 
 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive results 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics of the variables involved in our regression models. 
Concerning the household characteristics, given the lack of information on household 
income our proxy variable is a question asking “A household may have different 
sources of income and more than one household member may contribute to it. Thinking 
of your household’s total monthly income, is your household able to make ends 
meet…” with answers from “with great difficulty” (value 1) to “very easily” (value 6). 
Relationship quality is measured on a 0–10 scale, following the question “How satisfied 
are you with your relationship with your partner/spouse?” Concerning the partners’ 
characteristics, education is measured according to ISCED levels, while employment is 
asked through a question on the type of current work and daily activities. In our sample, 
employed people are individuals with a job and regular earnings, and include therefore 
all those employed and self-employed, those momentarily on maternity leave, paternal 
leave, or childcare leave, those working in a family business or farm, and those in 
military or civil service. Students, the retired, homemakers, and other individuals 
unable to work are excluded from the category of employed people. In the regression 
models, education is represented by a dummy taking value 1 if the person is a graduate, 
whereas employment is coded by a set of three dummies representing unemployment, 
individuals working from 1 to 39 hours per week, and those working at least 40 hours 
per week. 
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Looking at the descriptive statistics, the ability of the household to make ends meet 
seems more compelling in Bulgaria than in the other countries, especially compared to 
France and Lithuania. Marriage is far more widespread in Bulgaria and Lithuania, with 
the lowest rate of 67% for France, whereas the average number of children ever born in 
these country samples does not vary much. Interestingly, over the period covered by our 
panel, 24% of couples from the French sample reported new childbearing, against 22% 
in Hungary, 19% in the Czech Republic, 17% in Lithuania, and only 13% in Bulgaria. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics. Mean or frequency of model covariates by 
country 
 Bulgaria Czech R. France Hungary Lithuania 
Household and couple characteristics      
The household is able to make ends 
meet (range: [1,6]) – mean 
2.2 
(0.02) 
3.1 
(0.05) 
3.5 
(0.03) 
3.3 
(0.01) 
3.5 
(0.04) 
Couples with a new childbirth between 
the two waves (%) 
13 19 24 22 17 
Mean number of children ever born 1.7 
(0.02) 
1.7 
(0.04) 
1.7 
(0.03) 
1.6 
(0.02) 
1.6 
(0.04) 
Married couples (%) 87 86 67 82 90 
Relationship quality 
(range: [0,10]) – mean 
8.8 
(0.03) 
8.8 
(0.06) 
8.6 
(0.03) 
8.9 
(0.03) 
8.5 
(0.06) 
Woman’s characteristics      
Employed (%) 70.5 87.5 80.1 83.4 82.3 
Average number of hours worked 
(for employed) 
42.6 
(0.22) 
40.6 
(0.40) 
34.4 
(0.29) 
39.1 
(0.22) 
39.2 
(0.51) 
Graduated (%) 23.4 35.4 40.6 21.7 14.0  
Mean age (in years) 34 
(0.11) 
34 
(0.24) 
35 
(0.15) 
34 
(0.12) 
34 
(0.28) 
Man’s characteristics      
Employed (%) 74.7 94.1 92.1 88.2 91.1 
Average number of hours worked 
(for employed) 
46.1 
(0.27) 
48.2 
(0.42) 
42.6 
(0.30) 
44.9 
(0.22) 
43.8 
(0.52) 
Graduated (%)  14.3 26.6 33.2 17.3 15.7  
Mean age (in years)  38 
(0.12) 
37 
(0.28) 
37 
(0.18) 
37 
(0.15) 
37 
(0.30) 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
The satisfaction of the couple relationship is quite high and homogenous across the 
five countries. In the age range selected, employment rates are quite high, with slightly 
different patterns for men and women. Unemployment is more widespread in Bulgaria, 
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while the highest level of female employment is found for the Czech Republic, together 
with the highest level of male employment. The average number of hours worked by 
women does not follow exactly the employment patterns when compared to men. 
Employed women work for more hours in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, suggesting 
that in France part-time work is more common than in the other countries, as already 
found in the literature (Aassve, Fuochi, and Mencarini 2014a). In the end, education 
levels are the lowest in Lithuania for women and in Bulgaria for men. The highest 
diffusion of high education levels are, as expected, in France for both sexes. 
 
 
4.2 The effect of couple typology on childbearing 
As can be seen from Table 5, we made estimations separately by parity and 
respondents' sex. Parity zero refers to the transition to having a first child, whereas 
parity one refers to the progression to a second child, and parity greater than 1 refers to 
any higher order birth. As for the four couple types, the reference category is that 
referring to egalitarian attitudes and gender-equal sharing (i.e., “Consistent equality” 
type). Thus, the three couple types reported in Table 5 represent deviations from that 
category. Robust standard errors are estimated, thereby adjusting for the country 
clustering. 
Three major results are immediately evident from Table 5. First, we find that the 
coefficients of the couple types differ in significance and magnitude for men and 
women. Secondly, the typology matters, mainly and more significantly, for parity one, 
whereas it has no impact for the onset of childbearing (i.e., parity zero), while, when 
considering birth orders over the second parity, it has an impact only for men, and with 
a reversed sign. These results are consistent with the literature that identifies 
specifically the (reorganisation of the) gender division of labour after the first child as 
salient for subsequent fertility (e.g., Oláh 2003; Torr and Short 2004).  
Compared to the reference couple type “Consistent equality” (i.e., egalitarian 
ideology and gender-equal housework-sharing), the three other couple types are all 
significant and show a negative impact on the likelihood of having another child 
between the waves, for female respondents and the progression to the second birth. This 
implies that women with gender-unequal attitudes, or with gender-unequal housework-
sharing, or with both characteristics together, are less prone to have a second child than 
women with gender-equal attitudes and gender-equal housework.  
Explanations can be made for each different couple type. We start with the 
“Inconsistency 1” type, the reasoning for which is straightforward. This category 
consists of couples where the respondent declares gender-equal attitudes, but the 
household work is gender-unequal, with women doing the bulk of the housework. 
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Focusing on the female sample first, where the effect on having a second child is clearly 
negative, one would argue that women here strongly disagree with the male partner. 
Women might be experiencing a feeling of disappointment due to unfulfilled 
expectations since they have a gender-equal ideology, but at the same time in actuality 
have to cope with a traditional sharing of housework. This kind of mismatch is likely to 
decrease the likelihood of further childbearing.  
The third category, the “Inconsistency 2” type (i.e., gender-unequal ideology and 
gender-equal household work) is less intuitive, in the sense that it is harder to 
understand why the partners would organise themselves in this way. Women in this 
category report traditional attitudes, but nevertheless live in couples where the partners 
share the household work. Further investigation (not displayed here) shows that, 
compared to the other typology categories, “Inconsistency 2” is characterised by a 
smaller proportion of employed men and thus by a smaller average number of hours 
spent by men in the labour market. On the other hand, women belonging to this couple 
type are more likely to be employed and work for longer hours than women in the 
categories “Consistent Inequality” and “Inconsistency 1”. Moreover, in the couple type 
“Inconsistency 2” there is a greater proportion of employed women (83%) than 
employed men (79%). These facts suggest that the housework-sharing of 
“Inconsistency 2” might be gender-equal mainly due to external constraints; for 
instance, labour market conditions of the couple or time availability. Perhaps, if these 
external conditions were different, the housework-sharing would have been more 
gender unequal, as gender-unequal attitudes would make us predict. These arguments 
suggest that “Inconsistency 2” for women is likely to be another case of “unfulfilled 
expectations”. Female partners would have preferred a more traditional household 
organisation, but they are somehow pushed to delegate household tasks as their male 
partners have a considerable amount of spare time. The underlying dynamics of this 
kind of couple cannot be determined with certainty and it might be that lower fertility 
derives from unobserved couple characteristics (such as economic difficulties, etc.); 
nevertheless, it has to be kept in mind that the frequency of this category is relatively 
small (and concentrated in Bulgaria and Hungary), and so does not constitute a large 
contribution to the overall progression to second childbearing.  
The group “Consistent inequality”, representing couples where the respondent 
declared gender-unequal ideology and the household work was consistently gender-
unequal, thus exemplifying the male breadwinner model, also associates with a lower 
rate of fertility progression to the second child. This result is not consistent with our 
initial simple gender ideology-gender equality hypothesis, since “Consistent inequality” 
should reflect a non-existent or a smaller mismatch between gender ideology and 
equality. Consequently, our results would suggest that consistency between gender 
ideology and gender equality is only favourable for childbearing as long as there is 
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gender equality. The result is important, not least because the “Consistent inequality” 
arrangement represents by far the largest group in all the countries but France (see 
Table 1), and includes 58% of the overall sample. The impact of “Consistent 
inequality” is consequently driven by the Eastern European countries, which make up 
92% of this group. There are several possible explanations for the pattern of “Consistent 
inequality” observed for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Lithuania. The 
Eastern European countries have experienced a remarkable fertility decline since the 
collapse of the Communist regime. The fall of the Iron Curtain also brought about 
dramatic societal upheavals. Prior to the 1990s the State provided support to families in 
the form of maternity leave, child allowances, and childcare facilities, and so 
outsourcing of traditional family activities was already in place. Consequently, one 
would expect gender ideology to lean towards the more egalitarian and liberal end of 
the scale. However, these socialist policies have undergone drastic revision in the 
transition period since the 1990s, reverting in the direction of the male breadwinner 
model (Robila 2004; Szelewa and Polakowski 2008). Moreover, the structural changes 
following the collapse of the socialist regimes were not accompanied by a shift to less 
traditional values in these societies, and this contributed to their fertility decline (Spéder 
and Kapitány 2014).  
Table 5 also reports estimates for the control variables' effect. These results are 
consistent with the literature. In particular, we controlled for the age of the man and the 
woman of the couple, for higher education of both partners (her education being not 
significant, whereas his higher education has a positive effect in two models for parity 1 
or higher); for the quality of the relationship (for parity zero and parity 1 in the model 
for the female respondent); for the occupational status of her and him in the couple 
(noting that his occupational status matters more often).  
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Table 5: Logit regressions: The impact of couple type on a new birth  
 Parity 0 Parity 1 Parity>1 
Respondent Men Women Men Women Men Women 
(Ref: Consistent equality)       
Consistent Inequality 0.28 
(0.43) 
0.37+ 
(0.20) 
-0.43* 
(0.21) 
-0.84*** 
(0.15) 
1.05* 
(0.47) 
-0.33 
(0.68) 
Inconsistency 1 (gender-unequal housework, equal 
attitudes) 
-0.37 
(0.45) 
-0.22 
(0.34) 
-0.40 
(0.29) 
-0.68*** 
(0.13) 
0.51+ 
(0.28) 
-0.08 
(0.42) 
Inconsistency 2 (gender-equal housework, unequal 
attitudes) 
0.26 
(0.40) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
-0.64+ 
(0.36) 
-1.22*** 
(0.37) 
1.09* 
(0.51) 
-0.59 
(0.54) 
The household is completely able to make ends meet 0.17 
(0.50) 
0.19 
(0.23) 
0.16 
(0.44) 
-0.44** 
(0.16) 
0.69 
(0.48) 
-0.17 
(0.27) 
The couple is married 0.99*** 
(0.16) 
0.67*** 
(0.15) 
-0.39 
(0.29) 
-0.01 
(0.43) 
-0.17 
(0.57) 
-0.52 
(0.41) 
Relationship quality 0.05 
(0.05) 
0.14+ 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.05* 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.14) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
Age of the woman -0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.11** 
(0.04) 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
The woman is a graduate 0.12 
(0.13) 
0.16 
(0.15) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
0.03 
(0.22) 
-0.03 
(0.34) 
0.07 
(0.29) 
(Ref. The woman is not employed)       
The woman is employed and works up to 39 hours per 
week 
0.37 
(0.32) 
0.62+ 
(0.34) 
-0.28 
(0.30) 
0.15 
(0.18) 
-0.31* 
(0.13) 
-0.09 
(0.34) 
The woman is employed and works at least 40 hours 
per week 
-0.07 
(0.26) 
0.13 
(0.36) 
-0.12 
(0.09) 
-0.14 
(0.29) 
-0.57 
(0.40) 
-0.47* 
(0.22) 
Age of the man -0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.06+ 
(0.03) 
-0.07* 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.04+ 
(0.02) 
The man is a graduate 0.23 
(0.28) 
0.02 
(0.10) 
0.15 
(0.31) 
0.62*** 
(0.18) 
0.42*** 
(0.08) 
-0.10 
(0.31) 
(Ref. The man is not employed)       
The man is employed and works up to 39 hours per 
week 
0.65* 
(0.32) 
0.16 
(0.31) 
0.75** 
(0.25) 
-0.17 
(0.21) 
-0.83* 
(0.34) 
-0.45 
(0.29) 
The man is employed and works at least 40 hours per 
week 
-0.14 
(0.34) 
0.75*** 
(0.23) 
0.20 
(0.17) 
-0.03 
(0.18) 
-0.97** 
(0.37) 
-0.16 
(0.13) 
(Ref. Bulgaria)       
Czech Republic -0.99*** 
(0.13) 
0.11 
(0.09) 
0.64*** 
(0.08) 
1.35*** 
(0.18) 
-0.75*** 
(0.05) 
0.15*** 
(0.04) 
France -0.88** 
(0.27) 
-0.07 
(0.24) 
1.61*** 
(0.29) 
1.28*** 
(0.16) 
0.95*** 
(0.25) 
0.41 
(0.31) 
Hungary  -0.61*** 
(0.09) 
-0.16* 
(0.07) 
0.74*** 
(0.09) 
0.63*** 
(0.11) 
0.27*** 
(0.05) 
0.30*** 
(0.08) 
Lithuania -0.94*** 
(0.18) 
-0.43** 
(0.16) 
0.60*** 
(0.11) 
0.30** 
(0.10) 
0.54*** 
(0.13) 
0.28** 
(0.11) 
Constant 0.94+ 
(0.53) 
1.13 
(1.00) 
2.27** 
(0.69) 
3.07** 
(1.05) 
0.12 
(0.82) 
0.97 
(0.63) 
N 493 559 812 1151 1799 2354 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at country level). 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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5. Conclusion 
In this analysis we have constructed a four-category couple typology based on gender 
ideology and equality in household sharing using individual-level data from five 
European countries. As outlined in our theoretical section, the underlying hypothesis is 
that consistency between gender attitudes and equality in the sharing of partners’ 
household tasks has a positive effect on childbearing outcomes, whereas inconsistency 
should lower fertility. As we have shown, our results only give partial support to this 
hypothesis. Indeed, couples who are gender-equal in attitudes and also have a higher 
level of sharing household chores are more likely to have a second child. In line with 
our hypothesis, we have found that the two types of couple that represent 
inconsistencies between attitudes and actual division of household labour are associated 
with lower fertility. However, contrary to our hypothesis, we also find consistent 
inequality to be associated with the lower likelihood of having a second child. This 
means that male breadwinner couples also, at least for the countries considered in our 
study, have lower parity progression.  
In general, and importantly, the couple typology becomes salient only when 
considering the birth of the second child, whereas the couple type has no effect on the 
onset of parenthood. Lower progressions to second birth are prompted by inconsistency 
between attitudes and sharing, as hypothesised. This is a relevant result in terms of 
fertility behaviour, since it is well-known that one of the fundamental drivers of low 
fertility is the lack of progression from the first to the second child, and therefore family 
policies addressing the issue of gender equality may have an effect on fertility if this 
parity (i.e., couples with one child) is targeted.  
Family arrangements corresponding to “Consistent inequality” (i.e., fully 
traditional families) and “Inconsistency 2” (traditional attitudes and equal sharing of 
housework) have a positive impact on the likelihood of a new birth only among men, 
and for higher fertility parity. In the case of “Inconsistency 2” this could suggest that 
when the family consists of a large number of children, fathers necessarily take on more 
of the housework. As for “Consistent inequality”, the positive impact for male 
respondents might be driven by the fact that men will be more willing to have three or 
more children if the woman is doing most of the housework, and especially if they 
belong to a gender-traditional family. 
It is interesting to compare our results with those of Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and 
Brandén (2013), who find that, for Sweden, only women with gender-equal attitudes 
and gender-unequal housework (thus experiencing inconsistency) have less probability 
of having a child than women with equal attitudes and equal housework division. Being 
consistently unequal is not significantly different from being consistently equal. 
However their study only focuses on Sweden, a country where gender ideology and 
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equality have come rather far. The comparison between our results and those previous 
results raises an interesting idea: the effect of the gender ideology–gender equality 
mismatch may impact differently on fertility depending on the stage to which the 
society has evolved on the gender ideology and gender equality path.  
Our analysis is based on five countries, with at least two different cultural patterns 
(i.e., France and the others). We build here a couple typology using a unique threshold, 
equal for all the countries, to distinguish between gender equality and gender inequality 
either in housework-sharing or in attitudes. It is probable that the salience of a couple 
typology depends on the distribution (and hence diffusion) of the groups contained 
within the typology. That said, it is important to bear in mind that, despite the 
heterogeneity across European countries, our analysis brings further support to the 
argument that fertility increases when gender ideology is not traditional and the woman 
does not bear a disproportionate amount of the household work. Since low fertility in 
Europe is driven by relatively high rates of childlessness and a low rate of parity 
progression from one to two children, these results would strongly indicate that 
improving equal gender opportunities should be considered very seriously, in line with 
those policies introduced over the last couple of decades in the Nordic countries, where 
fertility rates are above the European average level.  
Whereas our overall results appear robust,9 it is important to point out a few 
caveats. The most relevant one is that, since we do not have information about the 
partner’s specific attitudes, our estimation might be biased by the fact that partners 
differ in their reporting of gender attitudes. Another important issue arises from the fact 
that the male response quality is often poor and it is well known that men tend to over-
report their own contribution to household-sharing (Baxter 1997). One should also 
emphasise that a full empirical test of the theoretical argument made would require long 
comparative panel data. With the two waves currently available from the GGS we are 
not able to address the inherent dynamic temporal argument, and we are not able to 
compare a larger number of countries. 
 
  
                                                          
9 We tried several specifications of the covariates, and the significance of the four types of couple was quite 
stable and drove us substantially to the same results. Moreover, when we specified the categories of the 
typology in a different way, replacing the typology in the models with the two indices of gender equality and 
ideology in the form of dummies and their interaction (which is equivalent to our type “Consistent equality”), 
we found confirmation for our current final results. A gender-equal family arrangement consistent with 
gender-equal attitudes affects positively the progression to a second birth. 
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